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Abstract 
This paper models the two-way relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance of microfinance institutions of Asia. Unlike previous studies, the phenomena of 
better corporate governance mechanisms present in more financially oriented microfinance 
institutions is worth investigating. Using a panel of 173 microfinance institutions in 18 Asian 
countries between 2007 and 2011, a comprehensive corporate governance index (CGI) based 
on seven corporate governance variables is being constructed as a proxy for the overall 
corporate governance mechanism of MFIs. Our results suggest that corporate governance has 
no significant impact on financial stability of MFIs of Asia. However, financial performance 
to some extent does drives corporate governance mechanisms in MFIs after controlling for 
MFI related characteristics. We find greater operating expenses and higher portfolio yield to 
be associated with improved governance practices in microfinance institutions. Study opens 
new avenues of research in corporate governance and financial performance literature for the 
academia. Given the revealing results of financial performance as a determinant of better 
corporate governance practices, policy makers and regulators in Asia should devise corporate 
governance policies and guidelines in a way not undermining the financial objectives of 
microfinance.  
 
 Introduction 
Microfinance serves as a parallel financial sector by reaching the poor and under-privileged 
clients which commercial financial institutions fails to reach hence, can be used as an 
effective poverty alleviation tool in regions like Asia where majority of the world’s poor live  
(Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Brau and Woller, 2004). In the recent years corporate governance 
has attracted lot of attention from different stakeholders of microfinance because many of the 
failures of MFIs in past have been linked with the presence of weak governance system in 
those institutions. CSFI (2014) consider quality of management and governance as one of the 
most pressing risks facing this industry. Labie and Mersland (2011) highlighted the 
importance of good governance in overall performance of MFIs. Mersland and Strom (2008); 
(2009); Coleman and Osei (2008); Manderlier et al. (2009); Bassem (2009); Tchuigoua 
(2010); Aboagye and Otieku (2010); Hartarska and mersland (2012) and Galema et al. (2012) 
found empirical evidence of how corporate governance leads to improved financial 
performance in microfinance. While some corporate governance studies support the existence 
of unidirectional relationship (Wruck, 1989; Randoy and Goel, 2001; Mitton, 2002; 
Fernandez and Gomez, 2002; and Chen et al. 2007), literature also highlights the importance 
of studying direction of causality between corporate governance and firm performance (Kole, 
1996; Bohren and Odegaard, 2001; Farooque et al. 2007a; 2007b; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). 
This study responds to the need of more literature on causal relationship between corporate 
governance and performance of MFIs by first studying whether good governance in MFIs of 
Asia lead to improved financial performance and later answering the question whether more 
financially sustainable MFIs of Asia are also better in their governance structures. However, 
we take a separate approach from prior literature, which provide separate investigation of 
different characteristic of corporate governance and ignore their combined effect which is 
considered more effective approach (Bebchuk et al. 2008). We employee various 
characteristics of corporate governance from the perspective of leadership and ownership 
structure to construct a corporate governance index (CGI) for MFIs of Asia which is used as a 
proxy for overall corporate governance mechanism of MFIs.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the relevant literature followed by 
research methodology presented in section III. The descriptive and empirical analysis is 
presented in section IV followed by conclusion and recommendations at the end in section V. 
Literature 
Corporate governance practices have been high on the MFI agenda for the past decade 
because of the major shift from subsidies and donations to capital as source of fund and 
increased agency problems and lack of transparency in microfinance than other sectors of the 
economy (Labie, 2001). It is defined as the mechanism for setting goals and objectives of 
company and means for achieving those goals and objectives (OECD principles of corporate 
governance, 2004). The phenomenon got popularity and consideration of financial 
economists after 1976 publication of Jensen and Mackling’s and has its basis in the agency 
theory which states that there is a conflict between the interest of managers and shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Corporate governance provides solution to the agency 
problems and is defined as the mechanism which forces managers to act in the best interest of 
shareholders (Denis, 2001). However, in microfinance these practices are slightly different 
from other sectors because of MFIs dual mission, ownership type, and board of director’s 
responsibility and risk valuation (Rock et al. 1998). Thus, corporate governance in 
microfinance can be divided into two dimensions; leadership structure of MFIs and 
ownership structure of MFIs. Leadership structure involves issues related to board of 
directors and top management team while ownership structure deals with different 
institutional setups in microfinance.  
Board is the most important element of leadership and control mechanism because it is the 
board that has the final power and responsibility over the decisions of the firm (Jensen, 1993) 
and acts on the behalf of shareholders and provides the services of liaison between managers 
and owners hence reducing agency conflicts between them. Agency theory advocates 
separation of management decisions from corporate control by separating the roles of CEO 
and chairman of the board as it is the board that guides managers in strategic decisions and 
monitor and supervise them in taking action on those decisions (Jensen, 1993). Agency 
theory states that CEO duality brings more CEO entrenchment in the organization which 
hinders board’s ability to effectively monitor management decisions while organization 
theory gives rationale in favor of CEO duality and states that it brings unity of command in 
organization and is beneficial. Women clients are generally considered the best target market 
for MFIs as microfinance focuses on the provision of financial services to small informal 
sector businesses involved in self-employment which are mostly run by women (Aghion and 
Morduch, 2005; Brau and Woller, 2004). MFIs could benefit by female leadership as females 
in an institution know better what kinds of products females like and how to target them. 
Many of the MFIs are non-profit organizations (NPOs) which are considered weak in 
governance structure because of high agency problems and low involvement of board in 
monitoring management (Peck and Rosenberg, 2000) compared to their counter parts 
shareholder firms (SHF). 
Firm Performance and corporate governance 
Different views are present in literature on the nature of corporate governance and 
performance relationship. Some studies assume corporate governance to be an exogenous 
variable that affects firm performance while alternative view suggests that corporate 
governance itself is affected by prior firm performance hence suggesting its endogenous 
nature. Jensen and Meckling (1976); Morck et al. (1988); Wruck (1989); Welbourne (1999); 
Randoy and Goel (2001); Mitton (2002); Fernandez and Gomez (2002); Oxelheim et al. 
(2003) and Chen et al. (2007) studied different corporate governance variables exogenously, 
suggesting either the monotonic or non-monotonic nature of corporate governance and 
performance relationship. In microfinance literature Mersland and Strom (2008); (2009); 
Coleman and Osei (2008); Manderlier et al. (2009); Bassem (2009); Tchuigoua (2010); 
Aboagye and Otieku (2010); Hartarska and mersland (2012) and Galema et al. (2012) found 
the significant impact of different corporate governance indicators on performance of MFIs. 
However, many studies in literature provide rationale for the two-way or reverse-causality in 
corporate governance and performance relationship by studying different corporate 
governance variables endogenously (Kole, 1996; Loderer and Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998; 
Bohren and Odegaard, 2001; Farooque et al. 2007a; 2007b). Dalton et al. (1999); Borsch and 
Koke (2002); Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Wintoki et al. (2009) highlighted the 
importance of studying the direction of causality in corporate governance and performance 
relationship. Manderlier et al. (2009) recommended that further research should be done on 
the reverse causality in corporate governance and performance relationship in microfinance 
sector of South Asia. Cho (1998) concluded that investment affects value of firm which 
further affects ownership structure while ownership structure has no effect on corporate 
value. Gruszczynski (2006) pointed out that companies that have higher profit and low debt 
ratio will probably have good corporate governance ratings. Chung and Pruitt (1996) found 
evidence of two way causality in corporate governance and performance relationship. 
Farooque et al. (2007a; 2007b) also confirmed the bi-directional relationship and concluded 
that firm value is a determinant of board ownership. Chen et al. (2008) found that firms 
which changed their leadership structure were experiencing declining performance and their 
performance did not improve after changing leadership structure. Valenti et al. (2011) found 
evidence in support of resource dependence theory by suggesting that board size and 
outsiders in board are positively determined by firm performance. The literature concludes 
that corporate governance and firm performance could be jointly determined by each other, 
hence suggesting the presence of reverse or two-way causality in their relationship. This 
study focuses on both streams of research by studying the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance of microfinance institutions in both directions. 
Based on the above literature we develop following hypotheses: 
H1: corporate governance mechanism has significant impact on financial performance of 
MFIs.  
H2: Financial performance has significant impact on corporate governance mechanism of 
MFIs. 
The Construction of Corporate Governance Index (CGI) 
Prior studies provide evidence of the link between corporate governance practices and 
performance in microfinance (Mersland and Strom, 2008; 2009; Hartarska and mersland, 
2012; Tchuigoua, 2010; Aboagye and Otieku, 2010; Thrikawala et al. 2013; Galema et al. 
2012; Bassem, 2009; Polanco, 2005; Hartarska and Nadolnyal, 2007; Coleman and Osei, 
2008; Manderlier et al. 2009; Boehe and Cruz, 2013; Mori and Mersland, 2014; Strom et al. 
2014). However, all these studies provide separate investigation of different characteristic of 
corporate governance and ignore their combined effect which is considered more effective 
approach (Gompers et al. 2003; Bebchuk et al. 2008). Chen et al. (2007) highlighted the 
importance of combined measure of all corporate governance variables by pointing out that 
certain characteristic of corporate governance may complement other characteristic or may 
actually be a proxy for some other characteristic. Based on the above literature, we construct 
an index of seven corporate governance variables, related to leadership and ownership 
dimensions, from the perspective of microfinance sector of Asia. 
Board Size: Small board size is considered efficient control mechanism because when 
number of director increases beyond seven or eight, their performance decreases (Jensen, 
1993). According to Lipton and Lorsch (1992), when board size increases beyond ten 
members, it becomes difficult for all members to express their opinions. In the perspective of 
microfinance, board size of seven to nine members is considered ideal and five to eleven 
members is considered effective (council of microfinance equity funds, 2012). Hartarska and 
Mersland (2012) found evidence of improved performance in MFIs with board size of up to 
nine members. Therefore, we measure this indicator as value equals 1 if the board size is 
between seven to nine members and 0 otherwise. 
Presence of Female BODs: Female presence in boards is thought to be linked with increased 
MFI performance (Bassem, 2009) as women directors processes managerial skills like public 
relations, human resource and communication skills than operating and marketing skills 
(Thrikawala et al. 2013). Presence of gender diversity on boards also indicates that boards 
have broader perspective (council of microfinance equity funds, 2012).  This argument can 
also be supported by resource dependence theory. Adams and Ferreira (2009) found evidence 
of increased monitoring activities in firms having more gender diversity in their boards. This 
variable is measured as value 1 if MFI has female presence in board, 0 otherwise.  
Board Qualification: According to resource dependence theory, board acts as a resource 
provider for a firm in the form of human capital and relational capital (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Qualified and experienced directors bring skills like 
banking and finance, legal knowledge, community developments, social skills along with the 
information about the target market into the MFIs. Manderlier et al. (2009) considered board 
to be qualified enough if they had enough experience and knowledge in the field of 
microfinance. Presence of qualified directors is linked with increased MFI performance 
(CGAP Appraisal guide for MFIs, 2007; 2008; council of microfinance equity funds, 2012). 
Thus, board qualification is measured as value 1 if board has experience and knowledge in 
microfinance, 0 otherwise. 
Local Directors: Presence of international directors is linked with the improved performance 
of firms in conventional financial institutions (Oxelheim et al. 2003). This may be because 
international directors bring superior business practices in those firms and are better equipped 
with the required skills. However in the context of MFIs, presence of international directors 
on board is linked with the increased costs hence reducing the financial performance 
(Mersland et al. 2009). In MFIs, local directors are better equipped with the information of 
the local market trends which MFI has to serve. Thus, we measure this indicator as value 
equals 1 if board has local directors, 0 otherwise. 
CEO/Chairman Duality: Two-tier board structure is considered more effective than one-tier 
structure in MFIs because when both CEO and board chair positions are separated, it reduces 
the conflict between management and board hence increasing the performance (Coleman and 
Osei, 2008). When the roles of CEO and chairman of the board are merged, then the CEOs 
have more power and freedom in decision making which could lead to more risky decisions 
(Galema et al. 2012). Thus, CEO duality could mean lack of independent board in an 
institution which has been linked with worse financial and social performance (Hartarska, 
2005; Coleman and Osei, 2008). We measure CEO/Chairman duality indicator as value 1 if 
CEO and chairman roles are separated, 0 otherwise. 
Female CEO: Boehe and Cruz (2013) found evidence of improved performance in MFIs 
having more female members. Many MFIs in Asia that work with the mission of women 
empowerment mandate could benefit by bringing female membership at all levels of the 
management including its executive level (Campion et al. 2008) as female CEO is better able 
to gather information from females then a male CEO (Mersland and strom, 2009). Even in 
sectors other than microfinance, presence of females in the top management team has been 
linked with the improved performance in the literature (Welbourne, 1999). Therefore, we 
define this indicator as value 1 if MFIs CEO is female, otherwise 0. 
Ownership Type: Many policy advocates in microfinance calls for the transformation of 
NPOs into more profit oriented shareholder firms because they could be better governed by 
the banking authorities (Christen & Rosenberg, 2000; Jansson et al. 2004; Ledgerwood and 
White, 2006; Campion and White, 2001; Lauer 2008; Mersland, 2009). There are some 
benefits of regulation in SHFs on outreach and sustainability as regulated MFIs or SHFs offer 
variety of services in addition to lending and also collect savings which is linked with the 
better scope of outreach of the MFIs (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007; Lauer 2008). Servin et 
al. (2012) proposed SHFs to be more technically efficient than the NPOs at both inter-firm 
and intra-firm level. We measure ownership type indicator as value 1 if MFI is a SHF, 0 
otherwise. 
CGI is used as a proxy for overall corporate governance mechanism of MFIs. Each variable 
included in CGI is given value equal to 1 for the characteristic that is considered to be 
effective, for the overall performance of MFIs, 0 otherwise. Index is calculated by the sum of 
all indicators values. Maximum index value is 7 indicating effective governance mechanisms 
while lowest index value is 0 indicating weakest governance mechanisms in MFIs. Table 1 
shows the brief description of the indicators used for the construction of CGI for MFIs.  
Table 1 
 Description of corporate governance indicators 
Indicator  Description  
Board Size  Value equals 1 if the board size is between seven to nine members 
and 0 otherwise. 
Presence of Female 
BODs 
Value equals 1 if female directors are present in board, 0 
otherwise. 
Board Qualification Value equals 1 if board has enough experience and knowledge in 
microfinance, 0 otherwise. 
Local Directors Value equals 1 if board has local directors, 0 otherwise. 
CEO/Chairman 
duality 
Value equals 1 if CEO and chairman roles are separated, 0 
otherwise. 
Female CEO Value equals 1 if CEO of MFI is female, otherwise 0. 
Ownership type Value equals 1 if MFI is a SHF, 0 otherwise. 
 
Methodology 
Sample and data 
Microfinance sector in Asia was originated with the mission to offer financial services to the 
poorest which had been excluded from the conventional financial services. The region is the 
main recipient of microfinance, and given its vast population, also has the largest number of 
poor households in the world. In 2010, about 63 percent of the world’s extreme poor lived in 
East Asia and the Pacific (246 million) as well as in South Asia (507 million)
1
. This 
population forms an immense client base for microfinance, which has not gone unnoticed. 
Therefore we focuses on the microfinance sector of Asia as it can play an important role in 
financial and economic development of a region. 
MFIs that have a profile on Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX market), that are given 
at least 4 diamond rating by MIX market and that are rated by the microfinance rating 
agencies are included in the final sample of 173 MFIs. Our data for this study primarily 
comes from the MIX market
2
 website where around 1044 MFIs from 18 Asian countries 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Sri-Lanka, Tajikistan and 
Vietnam) have shared their data. Out of these, 418 MFIs have been given a rating of at least 4 
diamonds
3
 by MIX market based on the transparency and reliability of the data shared. Our 
final sample reduces to a total of 173 MFIs from 18 Asian countries for the period of five 
years from 2007 to 2011, as these were the only MFIs rated by the third party rating agencies 
and the only source of data for the variables used in the construction of corporate governance 
index (CGI) is those third party rating reports and the annual reports of respective MFIs. 
                                                             
1 World Bank, “The State of the Poor: Where Are the Poor….. What is the current profile of the World’s poor?” 
(accessed April 2013). 
 
2 MIX (Microfinance Information Exchange) market is a database for microfinance data where all microfinance 
institutions and supporting organizations share their data. MIX market plays an important role in improving 
transparency of this sector. www.mixmarket.org 
3 MIX market gives diamond scores to its MFI profiles on the basis of availability of products and client data, 
financial data, audited financial statements and rating reports. 4 and 5 rated MFIs are considered most 
transparent in terms of information sharing hence, are included in our final sample.   
Those rating reports could be accessed from the Rating Fund website
4
 while annual reports 
were extracted from MFIs respective website. Data for Human Development Index (HDI) has 
been collected from United Nations development Program (UNDP) website
5
 while data for 
GDP per capita is taken from the World Bank website
6
. 
Variables 
Financial Performance 
This study uses accounting based performance measures to assess financial performance of 
MFIs because many of the MFIs are the private financial institutions that have not gone 
commercialized yet and are not registered so their market-based performance measurement is 
not possible (Strom et al. 2014). Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Portfolio 
yield (PY) and operating expense ratio (OER) are used for assessing the profitability of MFIs 
and are a part of the ratios given by different policy guidelines for financial performance 
assessment of MFIs (SEEP Network 2010; CGAP 2007; 2008; Rosenberg 2009; Barres et al. 
2005). All these ratios belong to the profitability analysis and have been used number of 
times in microfinance literature for measuring the overall financial performance of MFIs. 
Along with these ratios Operational self-sufficiency (OSS) has also been used in the literature 
to measure sustainability. It is important to assess the performance of an MFI in terms of its 
self-sufficiency because day by day many MFIs are becoming commercialized and self-
dependent instead of depending on subsidies and donations (Imai et al. 2012; Aboagye and 
Otieku 2010; Strom et al. 2014; Cull et al. 2007; Mersland and Strom 2009; Manderlier et al. 
2009; Bassem 2009; Hartarska 2005). 
Controls 
Firm age, size, risk and regulatory status are the firm specific factors other than performance 
that also affect corporate governance practices of a firm (Black et al. 2006). Larger the age of 
a firm, better will be its corporate governance practices (Black et al. 2006). This may be 
because older firms have more experience and have had more time to improve their internal 
governance. Similarly larger and riskier firms are better governed. This study measures age 
                                                             
4 www.ratingfund2.org  Contains risk assessment reports of 383 MFIs from 73 countries. These MFIs have been 
rated by five microfinance rating agencies; Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil, MicroRate and M-Cril which are 
considered as official rating agencies by CGAP (Consultative group to assist the poor). Data for few of the 
indicators of corporate governance has also been extracted from institution’s respective websites. 
5 www.hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi Data collected on Jan 15th 2014 
6 www.worldbank.org Data collected on Jan 15th 2014 
 
of MFIs as log of years since establishment of MFIs (Black et al. 2006; Crombrugghe et al. 
2008), size as log of total assets of an MFI (Black et al. 2006; Mori and Mersland, 2014) and 
risk as portfolio at risk 30 days past due (PAR 30) (Hartarska and Mersland, 2012; Mersland 
et al. 2008). 
Black et al. (2006) considered regulatory status as the most important indicator affecting 
governance in firms. Regulatory status is measured as a dummy having value 1 if MFI is 
regulated by a banking authority, 0 otherwise. MFIs offer many types of lending services to 
customers like group lending, individual lending etc. Mersland and Strom (2009) considered 
loan methodology as an important dimension in MFIs governance performance studies. This 
study uses three dummies for lending methodology variable; first MFIs offering individual 
lending services, second MFIs offering group lending services and third MFIs offering both 
types of lending services. According to legal structure MFIs can be classified into five types; 
banks, rural banks, NBFIs, NGOs and credit unions or cooperatives (CGAP 2007 and 2008). 
Governance practices differ in MFIs according to their legal status (council of microfinance 
equity funds 2012). For example legal status of an MFI determines the ownership structure of 
MFIs and the decision making power in them (Lapenu and Pierret 2006). This study 
measures legal status as five dummy variables of banks, rural banks, NBFIs, NGOs and credit 
unions.  
Human development index (HDI) and GDP per capita are used as country controls in this 
study. Human development index is a UNDP indicator covering standard of living, 
knowledge and life expectancy. GDP per capita is a world development indicator calculated 
as total output of economy divided by number of people in an economy. 
Following models are formulated to study the relationship between financial performance and 
corporate governance mechanism of MFIs: 
H1: Corporate governance mechanism has significant impact on financial performance of 
MFIs 
H1a: Corporate governance mechanism has significant impact on return on assets (ROA) of 
MFIs. 
ROA = α + β1 CGI + β2 Log assets + β3 Log age + β4 PAR 30 + β5 GDP/capita + β6 HDI + β7 
RS1 + β8 LM1 + β9 LM2 + β10 LS1 + β11 LS2 + β12 LS3 + β13 LS4 + ε  (1.1) 
H1b: Corporate governance mechanism has significant impact on return on equity (ROE) of 
MFIs. 
ROE = α + β1 CGI + β2 Log assets + β3 Log age + β4 PAR 30 + β5 GDP/capita + β6 HDI + β7 
RS1 + β8 LM1 + β9 LM2 + β10 LS1 + β11 LS2 + β12 LS3 + β13 LS4 + ε  (1.2) 
H1c: Corporate governance mechanism has significant impact on operational self-sufficiency 
(OSS) of MFIs. 
OSS = α + β1 CGI + β2 Log assets + β3 Log age + β4 PAR 30 + β5 GDP/capita + β6 HDI + β7 
RS1 + β8 LM1 + β9 LM2 + β10 LS1 + β11 LS2 + β12 LS3 + β13 LS4 + ε  (1.3) 
H1d: Corporate governance mechanism has significant impact on portfolio yield (PY) of 
MFIs. 
PY = α + β1 CGI + β2 Log assets + β3 Log age + β4 PAR 30 + β5 GDP/capita + β6 HDI + β7 
RS1 + β8 LM1 + β9 LM2 + β10 LS1 + β11 LS2 + β12 LS3 + β13 LS4 + ε  (1.4) 
H1e: Corporate governance mechanism has significant impact on operating expense ratio 
(OER) of MFIs. 
OER = α + β1 CGI + β2 Log assets + β3 Log age + β4 PAR 30 + β5 GDP/capita + β6 HDI + β7 
RS1 + β8 LM1 + β9 LM2 + β10 LS1 + β11 LS2 + β12 LS3 + β13 LS4 + ε  (1.5) 
 
H2: Financial performance has significant impact on corporate governance mechanism of 
MFIs. 
CGIi* = Xi’β + Yi’γ + εi 
Where, 
Xi’β = β1ROA + β2ROE+ β3OSS+ β4PY + β5OER  
Yi’γ = γ1Log assets + γ2Log age + γ3PAR 30 + γ4GDP/capita + γ5HDI + γ6RS1 + γ7LM1 + 
γ8LM2 + γ9LS1 + γ10LS2 + γ11LS3 + γ12LS4                                             (2)                                     
H2a: Return on assets (ROA) has significant impact on corporate governance mechanism of 
MFIs. 
CGIi* = Xi’β + Yi’γ + εi 
Where, 
Xi’β = β1ROA 
Yi’γ = γ1Log assets + γ2Log age + γ3PAR 30 + γ4GDP/capita + γ5HDI + γ6RS1 + γ7LM1 + 
γ8LM2 + γ9LS1 + γ10LS2 + γ11LS3 + γ12LS4                                           (2.1)                                                                
H2b: Return on equity (ROE) has significant impact on corporate governance mechanism of 
MFIs. 
CGIi* = Xi’β + Yi’γ + εi 
Where, 
Xi’β = β1ROE 
Yi’γ = γ1Log assets + γ2Log age + γ3PAR 30 + γ4GDP/capita + γ5HDI + γ6RS1 + γ7LM1 + 
γ8LM2 + γ9LS1 + γ10LS2 + γ11LS3 + γ12LS4                                         (2.2) 
H2c: Operational self-sufficiency (OSS) has significant impact on corporate governance 
mechanism of MFIs. 
CGIi* = Xi’β + Yi’γ + εi 
Where, 
Xi’β = β1OSS 
Yi’γ = γ1Log assets + γ2Log age + γ3PAR 30 + γ4GDP/capita + γ5HDI + γ6RS1 + γ7LM1 + 
γ8LM2 + γ9LS1 + γ10LS2 + γ11LS3 + γ12LS4                                         (2.3) 
H2d: Portfolio yield (PY) has significant impact on corporate governance mechanism of 
MFIs. 
CGIi* = Xi’β + Yi’γ + εi 
Where, 
Xi’β = β1PY 
Yi’γ = γ1Log assets + γ2Log age + γ3PAR 30 + γ4GDP/capita + γ5HDI + γ6RS1 + γ7LM1 + 
γ8LM2 + γ9LS1 + γ10LS2 + γ11LS3 + γ12LS4                                         (2.4) 
H2e: Operating expense ratio (OER) has significant impact on corporate governance 
mechanism of MFIs. 
CGIi* = Xi’β + Yi’γ + εi 
Where, 
Xi’β = β1OER 
Yi’γ = γ1Log assets + γ2Log age + γ3PAR 30 + γ4GDP/capita + γ5HDI + γ6RS1 + γ7LM1 + 
γ8LM2 + γ9LS1 + γ10LS2 + γ11LS3 + γ12LS4                                         (2.5) 
Where  
CGI=Corporate governance index, PAR 30=portfolio at risk 30 days, HDI= human 
development index, RS1= Regulated MFIs, LM1= Individual lending, LM2=Group lending, 
LS1=Banks, LS2 =Rural banks, LS3=NBFIs and LS4=NGO. 
Analysis 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive analysis of all control and financial performance variables. 
The average ROA in MFIs is only 2.8% with minimum value of -4.9% and maximum value 
of 10.9%. Negative minimum value indicates that some MFI suffered losses in selected 
period of analysis. Standard deviation of 0.0353 indicates that the ROA of MFIs in our 
sample deviate from the mean value by 3.53%. The average value of ROE in our sample is 
0.14 which shows that on average MFIs earn the return of 14% on equity. Minimum value is 
-0.27 indicating some MFI in our sample suffered losses during the period of 2007 to 2011. 
However maximum ROE value is 0.5499 which means that in the selected sample the 
maximum return some MFI earned on its equity is 54.99%. The mean value of operational 
self-sufficiency is 1.17 with the minimum value of 0.67 and maximum value of 1.71. 
Operational self-sufficiency deviates from the mean by 0.223. The average yield on the gross 
loan portfolio of our sample 17.84% which shows that on average MFIs in our sample are 
earning 17.84% yield on their portfolios. The mean value of operating expense ratio indicates 
that in the MFIs selected, 16.19% administrative and overhead cost is incurred on gross loan 
portfolio. Minimum value indicates that some MFI in our sample incurred no cost on gross 
loan portfolio during some point of time in selected period of analysis. Maximum overhead 
and administrative cost some MFI in our sample bearded was 35.99% of the gross loan 
portfolio. 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics summary of the variables 
 Measurement  N Min. Max. Mean Median Std. Dev 
Return on 
assets (ROA) 
Net income after taxes 
and before donations / 
Average assets 
865 -0.0499 0.1099 0.02810 0.0249 0.0353 
Return on 
equity( ROE) 
Net income after taxes 
and before donations / 
Average equity 
865 -0.2780 0.5499 0.1404 0.1317 0.1709 
Operational 
self-sufficiency 
(OSS) 
Financial revenues / 
Financial expenses + loan 
loss expenses + operating 
expenses 
865 0.6782 1.7125 1.1793 1.1476 0.2233 
Portfolio yield 
(PY) 
[(Interest, fees and 
commission on loan 
portfolio / Average gross 
loan portfolio) – Inflation 
rate] / [1 + Inflation rate] 
865 -0.0742 0.4464 0.1785 0.1653 0.0999 
Operating 
expense ratio 
(OER) 
Operating expenses / 
Average gross loan 
portfolio 
865 0.0085 0.3599 0.1620 0.1466 0.0775 
Age (years) Number of years since 
establishment  
865 1 39 11.9711 11 7.1349 
Total assets 
(1000s $) 
Total assets in 1000s 865 0 5122359 90911 15043 3.4580 
Log assets Log of total assets of MFI 865 0 9.7095 7.1948 7.1773 0.7991 
Portfolio at 
risk (PAR) 
Value of loans 
outstanding whose 
payments are past 30 days 
due 
865 0 7.1143 0.0683 0.0157 0.2967 
Human Index of human living 865 0.4400 0.7840 0.6002 0.5510 0.0945 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
standard, life expectancy 
and education 
GDP/Capita Total output of an 
economy / number of 
people in an economy 
865 1687 22502 5943 4399 4720 
 
Descriptive statistics also shows that the average age of the microfinance sector of Asia is 
only 12 years which proves that this sector is still very young and is in its early stages. 
However one MFI in our sample is as old as 39 years. Minimum value of 0 indicates that 
MFIs established in year 2007 have also been included in our sample. The average size of the 
microfinance sector of Asia is 90911 dollars as measured by the mean of total assets. 
CGI is an ordinal variable whose values could range from 0 to 7. The description of CGI is 
shown in table 3. 
Table 3 
Description of corporate governance index 
CGI Frequency Percent Cum. 
1 5 0.58 0.58 
2 40 4.62 5.2 
3 140 16.18 21.39 
4 270 31.21 52.6 
5 265 30.64 83.24 
6 125 14.45 97.69 
7 20 2.31 100 
Total 865 100  
 
75% MFIs of our sample are regulated by some regulatory or banking authority while 
remaining 25% are non-regulated. 12% of our sample is composed of regular banks, 6% rural 
banks, 47% non-banking financial institutions, 31% NGOs and 4% is composed of credit 
unions. 21% MFIs of Asia included in our sample offer individual lending, 23% group 
lending and remaining 56% offer both kinds of lending services. 
Figure 1 depicts the overall corporate governance mechanism of MFIs of Asia according to 
their regulatory status. Regulated MFIs have a better system of overall corporate governance 
as compared to the non-regulated MFIs. The value of median is same for both regulated and 
non-regulated MFIs i.e. 4 however the greater variation in the non-regulated MFIs depicts the 
overall better corporate governance in regulated MFIs. Variance in corporate governance 
index for regulated MFIs is 1.29 compared to the variance of 1.47 for non-regulated MFIs. 
Minimum value of corporate governance index for regulated MFIs is 3 compared to the 
minimum value of 2 for non-regulated MFIs, showing that all regulated MFIs have overall 
corporate governance index score of at least 3. 
 
 Fig 1. Corporate Governance According To the Regulatory Status 
               Source: Based on authors self-calculations 
Figure 2 depicts the overall corporate governance mechanism in MFIs of Asia according to 
their legal status. Corporate governance index is used as a proxy for overall corporate 
governance system and the highest corporate governance index score of 5 for both regular 
banks and rural banks indicate that both have almost same level of corporate governance 
system. However the value of variance in CG Index for regular banks is 0.920 and for rural 
banks is 1.469. The value of variance in CG Index for regular banks is low compared to that 
of rural banks which shows that regular banks are the highest performing MFIs in terms of 
corporate governance system. The lowest performing MFIs are the credit unions having the 
median of 4 with the variance of 1.176. 
 
Fig 2. Corporate Governance According To the Legal Status 
Source: Based on authors self-calculations 
Figure 3 depicts the overall corporate governance mechanism of MFIs according to the 
lending type offered by them. MFIs that offer both individual and group lending services 
have the best corporate governance system as can be seen by the highest CG Index score of 5. 
MFIs that offer one type of lending service that is either individual or group have CG Index 
score of 4. However the variation in group lending methodology is more as the variance of 
CG Index for individual lending is 0.999 and for group lending is 1.407. MFIs that offer both 
kinds of services have the best system of corporate governance. 
 
Fig 3. Corporate Governance According To Lending Methodology                  
Source: Based on authors self-calculations 
Empirical Analysis 
Correlation 
Table 4 provides correlation matrix of all variables. All financial indicators; ROA, ROE, OSS 
and PY are positively and highly significantly correlated with each other at 0.01 level of 
significance which confirms the fact that all these indicators are different dimensions of one 
variable i.e. financial performance. OER however has a negative and highly significant 
correlation with all other financial indicators which again proves the above fact as OER 
measures the expenses of MFIs and lower ratio indicates better financial performance. 
However, none of the financial variables are significantly correlated with the response 
variable i.e. CGI. This shows that corporate governance mechanism of MFIs is not related 
with their financial stability as MFIs are more of the socially focused firms with the main 
focus on objectives like poverty reduction and women empowerment etc. especially in Asia. 
These findings are in lined with the findings of Strom et al. (2014) who found negative and 
highly insignificant correlation of ROA, ROE and OSS with corporate governance variables. 
Correlation results confirm the tradeoff between profitability and risk though the latter has 
positive but insignificant relationship with CGI. Nevertheless, positive sign shows that more 
risky firms need better control and monitoring systems hence better governance system 
(Black et al. 2006). Further results show that experienced firms have better governance 
mechanisms however they have more complex systems which demands better governance 
systems. 
Table 4 
Correlation matrix of CGI with financial performance and control variables 
  Correlation matrix (Financial Performance) 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Corporate 
Governance 
Index (CGI) 
1                    
2 Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
-
0.059 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
3 Return on Equity 
(ROE) 
-
0.029 
0.666
**
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
4 Operational self-
sufficiency (OSS) 
-
0.047 
0.793
**
 
0.660
**
 
1 
 
 
 
     
 
    
5 Portfolio yield 
(PY) 
0.033 0.284
**
 
0.131
**
 
0.097
**
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
      
6 Operating 
expense ratio 
(OER) 
0.050 -
0.134
**
 
-
0.227
**
 
-
0.292
**
 
0.437
*
*
 
1 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
7 Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
-
0.047 
0.120
**
 
-
0.099
**
 
0.058 0.264
*
*
 
0.200
*
*
 
1 
 
   
 
 
 
8 GDP/Capita -
0.019 
0.076
*
 
-
0.049 
0.051 0.172
*
*
 
0.127
*
*
 
0.778
*
*
 
1   
 
 
 
9 PAR 30 0.000 -
0.071
*
 
-
0.075
*
 
-
0.082
*
 
-0.043 -0.042 -0.044 -0.019 1 
 
 
 
10 Log age 0.041 0.047 0.109
**
 
0.013 -0.014 -
0.085
*
 
-
0.109
*
*
 
-0.071
*
 0.145
**
 
1  
11  Log assets 0.088
** 
0.031 0.095
** 
0.087
* 
-
0.169
** 
-
0.288
** 
-
0.100
** 
-
0.099*
* 
0.038 0.413
** 
1 
** Statistical significance at 1% level, * statistical significance at 5% level 
 
Regression 
Regression analysis is carried out in two parts; the first part focuses on the impact of 
corporate governance mechanism of MFIs on their financial performance while the second 
part analyzes the reverse-causality in governance and performance relationship by studying 
the relationship in reverse direction i.e. the impact of financial performance on corporate 
governance mechanism of MFIs. 
Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanism on financial Performance 
Generalized Least Square (GLS) models for panel data are used for analyzing the impact of 
corporate governance mechanism on MFIs financial performance. Table 5 shows the GLS 
model results for the impact of CGI on financial performance. 
Table 5 
Results for impact of CGI on financial performance of MFIs 
Models 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 
 ROA ROE OSS  PY OER 
Constant  -0.0344 
(-1.18) 
-0.0009 
(-0.01) 
0.8765*** 
(4.72) 
0.0720 
(0.92) 
0.2280*** 
(3.74) 
CGI -0.0014 
(-0.73) 
-0.0048 
(-0.55) 
-0.0072 
(-0.62) 
0.0046 
(0.94) 
0.0037 
(0.93) 
HDI 0.0549 
(1.46) 
-0.0697 
(-0.39) 
0.2060 
(0.87) 
0.2515** 
(2.53) 
0.1367* 
(1.71) 
GDP/capita -3.0000 
(-0.44) 
-0.0000 
(-0.10) 
-0.0000 
(-0.48) 
-0.0000 
(-0.07) 
0.0000 
(0.02) 
PAR -0.0053* 
(-1.70) 
-0.0338** 
(-2.15) 
-0.0424** 
(-2.09) 
-0.0052 
(-0.56) 
-0.0011 
(-0.18) 
Log age 0.0120* 
(1.88) 
0.0491 
(1.58) 
0.0010 
(0.02) 
0.0278 
(1.57) 
0.0038 
(0.30) 
Log assets 0.0019 
(0.80) 
0.0205* 
(1.79) 
0.0266* 
(1.78) 
-0.0138** 
(-2.10) 
-0.0186*** 
(-4.10) 
Regulated 
MFIs 
-0.0029 
(-0.49) 
-0.0040 
(-0.14) 
0.0187 
(0.50) 
-0.0178 
(-1.16) 
-0.0161 
(-1.27) 
Individual 
lending 
0.0080 
(1.38) 
0.0267 
(0.99) 
0.0456 
(1.26) 
-0.0068 
(-0.45) 
-0.0395*** 
(-3.17) 
Group lending -0.0002 
(-0.03) 
0.0162 
(0.59) 
-0.0174 
(-0.47) 
-0.0101 
(-0.66) 
-0.0201 
(-1.61) 
Banks -0.0036 
(-0.28) 
-0.0632 
(-1.04) 
-0.0657 
(-0.81) 
0.0042 
(0.12) 
0.0072 
(0.26) 
Banks (rural) 0.0159 
(1.10) 
0.0921 
(1.36) 
0.0808 
(0.89) 
0.0091 
(0.24) 
-0.0427 
(-1.37) 
NBFIs 0.0178 
(1.54) 
0.0068 
(0.13) 
0.0240 
(0.33) 
0.0351 
(1.16) 
-0.0095 
(-0.38) 
NGOs 0.0132 
(1.13) 
0.0171 
(0.31) 
0.0178 
(0.24) 
0.0253 
(0.83) 
-0.0107 
(-0.42) 
Wald-Chi2 24.27*** 25.11*** 16.10 37.53*** 48.31*** 
R Square 0.0648 0.0661 0.0477 0.1178 0.1732 
       *** Statistical significance at 1% level, ** Statistical significance at 5% level, * Statistical significance at     
10% level. Omitted variables are non-regulated MFIs, MFIs with individual and group lending, and credit 
unions 
By employing random effects model, it is seen that the overall corporate governance system 
has no significant impact on the MFIs financial performance. These results imply that 
profitability and sustainability of MFIs do not improve with better governance practices. We 
link these insignificant results of financial performance with corporate governance 
mechanism of MFIs to the fact that corporate governance involves the monitoring and control 
of an institution by the executive and top management levels. It involves the strategic level 
decisions that are taken in an institution. As profit generation and maximization is never a 
mission of MFIs, this could be the reason behind insignificant impact of CGI on financial 
performance of MFIs. 
The insignificant results of financial performance variables with the corporate governance 
mechanism of MFIs could be attributed to the endogenous nature of governance and 
performance relationship. Financial performance of MFIs of Asia is irrelevant of their 
corporate governance system as can be seen by the GLS model results. As reverse-causality 
may exist in this relationship so, the financial performance of MFIs may determine the 
governance practices in those MFIs. In this regard, next section studies the impact of MFIs 
performance on their corporate governance mechanism. 
Impact of Performance on Corporate Governance Mechanism 
Corporate governance index (CGI) constructed in this study is an ordinal variable with values 
from 0 to 7 in ascending order. The models for ordered response variable are the most 
suitable option for this kind of response variable. The values of CGI ranges from 0 to 7 in 
ascending order, with score 0 indicating weakest governance mechanisms and score 7 
indicating strongest governance mechanisms in MFIs. In ordered response models the 
number does not mean anything because the difference between first two scores is different 
than the difference between other two scores. But the fact that scores 7 is better than 6 and 
scores 6 is better than 5 and so on, provides suitable information about the nature of the 
variable (Wooldridge 2010, p. 504-508). 
The ordinal variable CGI is related to the continuous latent variable CGI* which measures 
corporate governance mechanism of MFIs. The linear model for CGI* is equal to 
CGIi* = Xi’β + εi 
Where, β = k x 1 and Xi’ does not contain a constant. 
The value of CGI* is unknown unless it crosses certain threshold points (α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, 
α6). 
Where, 
CGI = 1 if α-∞ < CGI* ≤ α1 
CGI = 2 if α1 < CGI* ≤ α2 
CGI = 3 if α2 < CGI* ≤ α3 
CGI = 4 if α3 < CGI* ≤ α4 
CGI = 5 if α5 < CGI* ≤ α6 
CGI = 6 if α6 < CGI* ≤ α∞ 
Gruszczynski (2006) used ordered logit model for estimating relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance for ordered response variable; firm CGI ratings. This study 
also estimates ordered logit model for the ordinal variable CGI for explaining the relationship 
between corporate governance and performance in MFIs of Asia. 
In the first part all financial performance variables are regressed together on CGI in the 
presence of control variables. As it can be seen from correlation table 4, all variables of 
financial performance are highly correlated with each other so the analysis of aggregate 
impact of all financial performance variables could produce biased results. This is why 
individual effect of each indicator is also seen on CGI by controlling the effect of control 
variables.  
Table 6 provides ordinal logit regression results for social performance and CGI. Model 2 
measures the aggregate impact of all financial performance indicators on CGI in the presence 
of control variables. Models 2.2 to 2.5 measure the individual effect of each financial 
performance indicator on CGI by controlling the effect of control variables. The values of 
chi-square shows that models depicted in table 6 are significant at 1% level of significance 
which indicates that all models are valid. 
Table 6 
Ordered logit regression results for models 1 to 6 
Models 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 
Dependant Variable: Corporate Governance Index (CGI) 
ROA -2.568 
(-0.79) 
-2.157 
(-1.20) 
    
ROE -0.389 
(-0.73) 
 -0.502 
(-1.32) 
   
OSS 0.222 
(0.44) 
  -0.350 
(-1.24) 
  
PY 1.323* 
(1.78) 
   1.383** 
(2.10) 
 
OER 1.655 
(1.61) 
    2.411*** 
(2.61) 
HDI -0.765 
(-0.66) 
-0.235 
(-0.21) 
-0.404 
(-0.35) 
-0.315 
(-0.28) 
-0.755 
(-0.65) 
-0.542 
(-0.47) 
GDP/capita 0.000 
(0.51) 
8.90e-06 
(0.42) 
0.000 
(0.48) 
9.81e-06 
(0.47) 
0.000 
(0.61) 
9.64e-06 
(0.46) 
PAR 30 -0.012 
(-0.07) 
-0.021 
(-0.12) 
-0.024 
(-0.13) 
-0.021 
(-0.12) 
0.007 
(0.04) 
0.005 
(0.03) 
Log age 0.031 
(0.12) 
0.117 
(0.46) 
0.113 
(0.44) 
0.097 
(0.38) 
0.048 
(0.19) 
0.041 
(0.16) 
Log assets 0.178* 
(1.65) 
0.083 
(0.83) 
0.089 
(0.88) 
0.088 
(0.88) 
0.114 
(1.12) 
0.163 
(1.53) 
Regulated 
MFIs 
0.087 
(0.50) 
0.050 
(0.29) 
0.0508 
(0.30) 
0.063 
(0.37) 
0.068 
(0.40) 
0.083 
(0.49) 
Individual 
lending 
-0.640*** 
(-3.81) 
-0.706*** 
(-4.28) 
-0.712*** 
(-4.34) 
-0.710*** 
(-4.32) 
-0.725*** 
(-4.41) 
-0.643*** 
(-3.84) 
Group lending 0.188 
(1.04) 
0.095 
(0.54) 
0.108 
(0.61) 
0.087 
(0.49) 
0.122 
(0.69) 
0.172 
(0.96) 
Banks 0.395 
(1.02) 
0.521 
(1.37) 
0.490 
(1.27) 
0.503 
(1.31) 
0.510 
(1.34) 
0.444 
(1.15) 
Banks (rural) 0.684 
(1.59) 
0.621 
(1.46) 
0.631 
(1.48) 
0.612 
(1.44) 
0.569 
(1.34) 
0.692 
(1.62) 
NBFIs 0.165 
(0.48) 
0.259 
(0.76) 
0.214 
(0.63) 
0.229 
(0.67) 
0.165 
(0.48) 
0.208 
(0.61) 
NGOs -0.016 
(-0.05) 
0.043 
(0.13) 
0.012 
(0.04) 
0.021 
(0.06) 
-0.034 
(-0.10) 
0.014 
(0.04) 
Threshold 
points  
      
α1 -3.549 -4.506 -4.606 -4.899 -4.395 -3.730 
α2 -1.297 -2.252 -2.353 -2.646 -2.142 -1.479 
α3 .320 -.639 -0.739 -1.033 -.531 0.136 
α4 1.775 .801 0.702 0.408 .911 1.586 
α5 3.344 2.354 2.256 1.961 2.472 3.148 
α6 5.519 4.520 4.422 4.128 4.643 5.321 
Log likelihood -1325.488 -1330.277 -1330.124 -1330.228 -1328.782 -1327.588 
LRChi-square 46.37*** 
(0.0002) 
36.79*** 
(0.0004) 
37.10*** 
(0.0004) 
36.89*** 
(0.0004) 
39.78*** 
(0.0001) 
42.17*** 
(0.0001) 
*** Statistical significance at 1% level, ** Statistical significance at 5% level, * Statistical significance at 10% 
level 
Omitted variables are non-regulated MFIs, MFIs with individual and group lending, and credit unions 
ROA has negative and insignificant relationship with corporate governance system of MFIs 
which indicates that MFIs earning higher return on their assets may not necessarily have 
better governance system. In fact negative sign indicates that higher profits could lead to 
worse governance in MFIs but this relationship is not significant. ROE also has negative and 
insignificant relationship with CGI which again shows that as MFI earns more on its equity, it 
does not necessarily leads to good governance system. These results are in lined with the 
findings of Strom et al. (2014) who found no relationship between MFIs previous financial 
performance and corporate governance and with the results of Mersland and Strom (2009) 
who found no relationship between financial performance and internal governance 
mechanism of MFIs. These results are also in accordance with the results of correlation table 
4 as no correlation was found between financial performance variables and corporate 
governance index. 
As all financial variables are highly correlated with each other, we also compute the 
individual effect of each financial variable on CGI by controlling the effect of control 
variables. Results of ROA and ROE are consistent in all models respectively. Results of OSS 
are positive in model 2 which becomes negative when individual effect of OSS is seen on 
CGI in model 2.3. However, these results are not significant. We link these inconsistent 
results to the fact that OSS is highly correlated with all other financial variables at 1% 
significance level as can be seen in correlation table 4. Negative and insignificant results of 
financial performance indicators could be justified by the particular nature of this sector as 
microfinance sector was developed as a reaction to the high poverty levels in Asia (Daher et 
al. 2013) so major players of microfinance work with the mission of social welfare instead of 
focusing on financial goals. Secondly the concept of socially responsible investments (SRI) is 
increasing day by day that is based on environmental, ecological, corporate governance and 
ethical criteria. Investors of SRI are interested mainly in returns with major focus on social 
benefits (Renneboog et al. 2008) and microfinance investments provide an attractive 
investment opportunity to socially oriented investors. Nature of the investor greatly 
influences MFIs structure and governance (Lapenu and Pierret 2006). So, the presence of 
those socially oriented investors in MFIs leads to more strict governance practices in those 
MFIs. 
The results of OER show positive and insignificant relationship between OER and CGI in 
model 2 however these results become highly significant in model 2.5 at 1% level of 
significance. These results again show the negative impact of financial performance on 
corporate governance of MFIs indicating as the day to day expenses of MFIs increases, 
likelihood of better governance in those MFIs also increases as these could lead to strict and 
rigorous control of resources by top management. These results are in lined with the findings 
of negative impact of performance on corporate governance of firms in sectors other than 
microfinance (D’Aveni 1994; Farooque et al. 2007a; 2007b; Elsayed 2007). 
Results of PY show positive and significant impact of PY on CGI at 10% level of 
significance in model 2. Significance of PY improves greatly to 5% level of significance in 
model 2.4 when individual impact of PY is seen on CGI by controlling the effect of control 
variables. Results of regression for PY shows that as MFI earn more returns on its portfolio 
there is greater likelihood that its corporate governance also improves. This may be because 
higher portfolio yield indicates more risky client profiles (Yu et al. 2014) and riskier firms are 
linked with more strict monitoring and control systems (Black et al. 2006). As PY is greatly 
determined by the interest rates MFI charges to its customers, many inefficient and non-
profitable MFIs could earn positive portfolio yield on their loan portfolios by charging higher 
interest rates. Many MFIs avail this benefit when competition is low in the area in which they 
operate. This could be the reason behind contrasting results of PY with the results of other 
financial performance indicators (MicroRate and Inter-American development bank 2003). 
Some contrasting results are present in financial performance variables and we attribute these 
contrasting results to the young age of microfinance sector of Asia hence, optimal level of 
governance has not settled fully in this sector (Strom et al. 2014). Results could also improve 
with better data set covering longer time period. 
The control variable MFI size has positive and significant results at 10% significance level in 
model 2. These findings are in lined with the findings of Black et al. (2006). Even though 
these results become insignificant in models 2.2 to 2.5, nevertheless they indicate that larger 
MFIs have more complex structures so they need more defined corporate governance 
mechanism. Similarly results of age of MFI are positive and consistent in all models even 
though insignificant. These results show that as MFI ages and matures, it gains more 
experience. Hence it has increased likelihood of better governance system (Black et al.  
2006). The insignificance of the results could be attributed to the fact that microfinance is an 
infant industry still in its development stages. The results for GDP per capita GNI show 
positive and insignificant impact of GDP per capita GNI on CGI. Even though insignificant 
results, positive sign of these results is in lined with the results of Strom et al. (2014). HDI 
has negative and insignificant impact on CGI in all models of table 6. 
The results of regulatory status show positive and insignificant impact of regulatory status on 
corporate governance mechanism of MFIs. Positive sign depicts that regulated MFIs have 
more likelihood of good governance system than non-regulated MFIs. Results of lending 
methodology shows that MFIs offering only individual lending services are less likely to 
have good governance system than MFIs offering group or both types of lending services. 
Individual lending is negative and highly significant at 1% significance level which proves 
the fact that MFIs offering group lending are more likely to have improved governance. We 
attribute these findings to the fact that group lending type could enhance monitoring and 
reduce information asymmetry problems since members of one group are better informed and 
have social ties with each other (Hermes and Lensink 2007). Results also point out that 
conventional banks and rural banks are more likely to have good governance system than 
credit unions in MFIs. 
Conclusion 
Using a panel data of 173 MFIs of Asia for a period of five years from 2007 to 2011, 
regression analysis of the study is carried out in two parts; first part studies the impact of 
corporate governance on MFIs financial performance while the impact of financial 
performance on overall corporate governance mechanism of MFIs is analyzed in the second 
part of the analysis. The results show that profitability and sustainability of MFIs do not 
improve with good governance practices. Conclusions of the study relates with the 
relationship of financial performance and corporate governance in MFIs. Corporate 
governance is little affected by the profitability status and sustainability of MFIs and these 
findings could be related to the increased trend of socially responsible investors in 
microfinance sector who greatly determines the governance structure of the MFIs in which 
they invest. Greater operating expenses do lead to better governance mechanism in MFIs 
which shows the negative impact of financial performance on corporate governance of MFIs 
indicating as the day to day expenses of MFIs increases, likelihood of better governance in 
those MFIs also increases as these could lead to more strict and rigorous control of resources 
by top management. However, contrasting effects are seen in the results of portfolio quality 
of MFIs which are positively linked with the corporate governance mechanism. These results 
are surprising as good governance is not affected by the profitability status of MFIs. This 
reinforces the fact that portfolio yield is not a good measure of overall financial performance 
of MFIs as it is determined by the interest rates MFI charges to its customers and many 
inefficient and non-profitable MFIs could earn positive portfolio yield on their loan portfolios 
by charging higher interest rates especially when the competition is low in their area of 
operation. The contrasting results of  portfolio yield compared to other financial performance 
measures seems to point out that it is not a good measure of long term overall profitability of 
MFIs as it is only determined by the interest revenues of loan portfolio. Hence, there is a need 
for future research on this topic and these findings should be considered while evaluating and 
appraising MFIs performance. 
Given the fact that, major players of microfinance sector of Asia works with the primary 
social goals, with focus on poverty alleviation and women empowerment, our results are very 
revealing and have important implications for researchers, policy makers and regulators of 
MFIs. 
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